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SUMMARY
This paper analyses the organization of the rice seed sector in Guinea with the overall objectives to assess
how organizational settings affect seed supply to small-scale farmers and to suggest institutional changes
that would favour seed service and uptake of varieties. Data were collected in Guinea, West Africa, using
focus group discussions with extension workers, farmers, representatives of farmers’ associations, agro-
input dealers, researchers and non-governmental organization (NGO) staff, and surveys of 91 rice farming
households and 41 local seed dealers. Findings suggest that the current institutional settings and perceptions
of stakeholders from the formal seed sector inhibit smallholder farmers’ access to seed. Seed interventions
in the past two decades have mainly relied on the national extension system, the research institute, NGOs,
farmers’ associations and contract seed producers to ensure seed delivery. Although local seed dealers play
a central role in providing seed to farmers, governmental organizations operating in a linear model of
formal seed sector development have so far ignored their role. We discuss the need to find common ground
and alternative models of seed sector development. In particular we suggest the involvement of local seed
dealers in seed development activities to better link the formal and the informal seed systems and improve
smallholder farmers’ access to seed from the formal sector.
I N T RO D U C T I O N
Rice (Oryza spp.) is one of the major food crops on which global food security
depends. Although most rice is produced in Asia, it is an important food crop in
many other parts of the world, including West Africa, especially Guinea, where rice is
the staple food. With a per capita consumption of 69 kg per year, Guinea is the second-
largest consumer of rice in West Africa after Sierra Leone (WARDA, 2007). Despite
production growth of 5.3% (2001–2005), this still cannot meet the local demand: 40%
of the rice consumed is imported (MAEF, 2007a). Increasing domestic rice production
is a priority in Guinea (MAEF, 2007b), as well as in other African countries.
As with any crop, seed availability and quality are considered bottlenecks in
developing competitive agricultural sectors (Bam et al., 2007; McDonald, 1998).
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Like many countries in the region, Guinea has tried to establish a formal national
seed system, with several projects addressing seed production, multiplication and
distribution (SNPRV, 2001). However, such efforts have yielded little success: only 8%
of the rice farmers have access to seed from the formal sector (SNPRV, 2001). Most
smallholder farmers, as in most developing countries, rely on the informal seed system
(Almekinders and Louwaars, 2002; SNPRV, 2001; Tripp, 2001) and depending on the
region and crop, 60–100% of the seed is locally produced and exchanged (Almekinders
et al., 2007; Duijndam et al., 2007; Ndjeunga, 2002; Nuijten, 2005; Okry, 2005).
Seboka and Deressa (2000) argue that the lack of seed multipliers and inefficient
distribution channels explain why farmers acquire informal seed through indigenous
social networks. Witcombe et al. (1996) further argue that low adoption of new varieties
is due to insufficient exposure of farmers to them. The formal seed sector’s dependency
on the extension system has often limited the number of farmers it can reach, especially
in marginal and remote areas, making formal seed expensive due to high transaction
and information-gathering costs (Almekinders et al., 2007). Further aggravated by the
declining support for public sector extension services, various donors believe that large
private seed enterprises could offer a solution.
The formal and informal seed systems generally operate as two parallel systems
serving different purposes (Sperling and Cooper, 2003). Recently, Almekinders and
Thiele (2003) proposed combining attributes of both systems, but how to do that seems
difficult since seed systems are poorly understood, especially informal ones (Thiele,
1999).
This paper contributes to the understanding of how the rice seed sector functions,
using Guinea as a case study. It examines the organization of the seed systems,
stakeholders, their roles and their perceptions of the other actors. The study:
1. analyses previous formal seed interventions to provide a historical perspective and
to shed light on alternative models;
2. identifies the main players in seed supply and seed system governance;
3. explains why the formal interventions (and the formal seed sector) reached few
smallholder farmers;
4. assesses how current organizational settings, institutional linkages and perceptions
inhibit seed flow towards small-scale farmers.
The paper ends by discussing how engaging local seed dealers may contribute to
making the rice seed sector more effective and seed interventions more sustainable.
M AT E R I A L S A N D M E T H O D S
Field activities were undertaken in Lower Guinea from June to December 2007 and
from June to December 2008. Lower Guinea was chosen for primary data collection
because: (i) stakeholders of the rice seed sector and their head offices are based in
Lower Guinea, which includes Conakry, the capital; (ii) seed projects using CBSS
(community-based seed system) and PVS (participatory varietal selection) approaches
began in Lower Guinea in the late 1990s, with successful project components being
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subsequently copied in other regions of the country; (iii) Lower Guinea hosts two of
the four seed centres of the country; (iv) Lower Guinea is the most representative
region regarding the diversity of rice cropping systems (Barry et al. 2007).
Field research covered three sub-prefectures (local levels of government): Molota,
Friguiagbé and Moussayah in the prefectures of Kindia and Forecariah. We selected
10 villages and, based on their proximity to each other, we grouped them into three
research sites. Site 1 consisted of Bokariya (9◦20.582N; 12◦48.582W; 52.6 m asl)
and Sangaran (9◦20.538N; 12◦48.010W; 66.8 m asl). They were chosen because of
their remoteness (about 90 km from Kindia, the regional capital) to learn about
farmers’ seed strategies in a situation of poor infrastructure, limited interventions of
development organizations and the absence of an important nearby market place.
Site 2 consisted of Seifan (9◦54.136N; 12◦47.21W; 78.1 m asl) and Dentègueya
(9◦54.303N; 12◦48.204W; 73.1 m asl). These two villages were selected because of
their proximity to the rice seed centre of Kilissi and the Centre de Recherche
Agronomique de Kilissi (CRAK), which is the national rice breeding unit. Site 3
covered Kinyaya (9◦58.044N; 12◦53.591W; 402 m asl), Hononkhouré (9◦57.143N;
12◦53.111W; 429 m asl), Tour (9◦57.273N; 12◦53.25W; 368 m asl), Yaya (9◦57.491N;
12◦54.479W; 436 m asl), Dandakhouré (9◦56.503N; 12◦53.897W; 400 m asl) and Sinta
(9◦57.246N; 12◦53.105W; 390 m asl). They were selected because of their proximity to
Kindia.
Primary data were also collected from Kindia, Friguiagbé and Sikhourou-Daffira
markets, all in Kindia and Forecariah prefectures. These were the markets most
often mentioned by the study households. Moreover, Sikhourou market was the major
market closest to Site 1. Sikhourou and Daffira are actually two different physical
markets. We combined them in this study because of the mobility of dealers from one
market to another.
The study used various data collection methods arranged in ways that outputs of
one method were complemented, fine-tuned and/or triangulated with data collected
using another research method. Archive research, literature review and discussions
with resource persons (local agricultural scientists and other experts on the rice seed
system) elicited information on agricultural policy in Guinea, past and current rice seed
projects and their stakeholders. We then held 14 focus group discussions to understand
stakeholders’ roles, their perception of the organization of the seed sector and to
explore their views on changes they believe might be necessary for a functional rice
seed sector. Focus group discussions involved farmers; representatives of the Fédération
des Organisations Paysannes de la Basse-Guinée; representatives of local farmers’
associations; staff of non-governmental organizations (NGOs): Association pour la
Promotion Économique de Kindia (APEK) and Structure d’Appui aux Réseaux
d’Agriculteurs et d’Agricultrices (SARA); researchers from the Institut de Recherche
Agronomique de Guinée (IRAG); agro-input dealers: Comptoir Agricole (CA) and
Société de Production et de Commercialisation des Intrants Agricoles (SPCIA) and
extension agents from the Agence Nationale pour la Promotion Rurale et du Conseil
Agricole (ANPROCA, ex-SNPRV). Focus group discussions involved on average nine
participants and lasted for about two hours each.
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Two surveys using distinct semi-structured questionnaires complemented the focus
group discussions. One survey targeted 91 rice farming households and the other
targeted 41 local seed dealers. The questionnaire administered to farmers addressed
their seed use, means of seed acquisition, seed sources and preferred sources, and
farmers’ relationships with seed dealers. The respondents were selected according
to their willingness to participate in the study, since it was conducted during the
cropping season, to better capture seed flows and observe seed transactions. The
questionnaire administered to seed dealers addressed seed dissemination, origins of
seed and varieties sold, seed quality requested by customers, price indications and
its progression throughout the year, and dealers’ relationships with their customers.
Local seed dealers were identified using the snowball sampling technique (see Vogt,
1999). Informal interviews and participant observation helped to collect data on
farmers’ relationships with seed dealers and gain additional insights in farmers’ seed
acquisition strategies.
R E S U LT S
Overview of the organization of the formal rice seed sector from the 1980s to 2007
Archival research, literature review and discussions with resource persons revealed
that in the past two decades, the rice seed sector underwent three major types of
interventions: a state-led intervention where bodies of the Ministry of Agriculture ran
the seed sector, an NGO-led intervention using the framework of a public-private
partnership for seed development and a collaborative intervention that opened the
door to farmers’ participation in varietal selection and seed development. Other
interventions, minor in scope, were organized by local NGOs and agro-input dealers.
This section describes the interventions, stakeholders and their roles, and analyses the
intervention approaches.
A state-led intervention. This was the first ever formal intervention in the rice seed sector
in Guinea. It began in the mid 1980s, as part of a broader food security programme.
Two early-maturing and improved upland varieties, CK 5 and CK 7, were chosen
among nine to increase national rice production (IRAG, 1996). Four well-equipped
seed centres were built in Kilissi, Koba, Guéckédou and Bordo to process (cleaning,
sorting and conservation), store and package seed of these two varieties.
The two main bodies of the Ministry of Agriculture, ANPROCA (extension) and
IRAG (agricultural research), managed the project, with financial support from the
World Bank and the national government. The agricultural research, through its rice
breeding unit, was responsible for producing breeder and foundation seed. The newly
created seed centres multiplied foundation seed, processed and packaged seed into 5
kg bags and developed, in collaboration with the extension service, technical notes
about the characteristics and use of each variety. The extension service was responsible
for disseminating the bags of seed and for training the farmers. Seed was distributed
free of charge to selected farmers who were expected to diffuse seed and technical
information within their community as stipulated by the training and visit extension
approach (Benor et al., 1984) in use in the 1980s. Seed distribution was coupled with
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farmer training sessions carried out with the Unités Expérimentales Paysannes (UEPs).
During these sessions improved technologies were discussed and tried out, such
as sowing techniques, weeding, mineral fertilization and other farming practices.
Before adopting the UEP approach, the agricultural research system undertook
conventional on-station research to generate technologies, including seed and varieties.
Plant breeding and varietal selection happened on-station and only after registration
were varieties released to farmers. In order to improve this classical scientist-led
approach, the UEP was introduced in the early 1990s to include farmers’ perspectives.
Technological development then evolved through three stages. On-station experiments
generated technologies which were tested on decentralized research stations (Points
d’Essai). On these stations, farmers hardly interacted with scientists. Promising
technologies were then transferred to farmers’ fields (UEP) and the diffusion was
believed to start from these on-farm experiments.
The two disseminated varieties (CK 5 and CK 7) did not meet farmers’ expectations
and were not adopted. Farmers and extension agents mentioned during focus group
discussions that the varieties were susceptible to weeds and too early-maturing,
requiring intensive bird-scaring at times when labour is needed for other crops. These
varieties also required delicate post-harvest management as they ripened in the middle
of the rainy season. The intervention therefore failed to meet its objective of supplying
seed to small-scale farmers. The withdrawal in the early 1990s of World Bank and
governmental funds as prescribed by the Structural Adjustment Programme did not
give opportunities to develop improved follow-up state-led interventions. This led in
1997 to the closure of the seed centres that were unprepared to operate independently
without subsidies. The seed centres were handed over to farmers’ associations and
agro-inputs dealers (SPCIA) in 2004, after which they have rarely functioned, with the
exception of the one in Koba that processed 350 t of seed at request of the FAO (Food
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) to cope with an emergency in
2007.
An NGO-led intervention. Since its establishment in 1996, Sasakawa Global 2000 (SG
2000) rapidly engaged in rice seed activities (SG 2000, 2005) focusing on the diffusion
of improved lowland varieties originating from the national breeding unit (CK 4, CK
73, CK 21, CK 801 and CK 211) and upland varieties (Nerica 1, Nerica 3 and Nerica
4) from the Africa Rice Center (AfricaRice, ex-WARDA). SG 2000 initiating this
intervention envisioned professionalizing and privatizing small-scale seed production
without relying on the heavily equipped seed centres. The intention was that by the end
of the intervention, farmers would have been trained as professional seed producers
(hereafter referred to as formal seed producers) capable of establishing their own seed
businesses. SG 2000 subsidized inputs (chemicals, fertilizers and seed) to stimulate
these seed producers. In practice:
1. Extension and research identified farmers as potential seed producers based on land
ownership, integrity and literacy. They recruited and trained them in techniques
of seed production.
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2. Formal seed producers signed a contract and received subsidized inputs from SG
2000 on credit. At the end of the season, SG 2000 bought the seed produced up to
the value of the inputs received and distributed these to seed producers selected in
other regions where there was a lack of seed.
In the course of the project SG 2000 continuously needed large amounts of seed to
scale-up in other regions of Guinea. SG 2000 thus became the major customer of the
formal seed producers and bought the entire seed produced throughout the project’s
life time. This same organizational setting is currently in use for Nerica multiplication
and dissemination under the African Rice Initiative project. SG 2000 reduced its
activities in 2003 and withdrew from the country shortly afterwards.
Like the state-led intervention, the NGO-led intervention also decided, based on
on-station performance, on varieties that would suit farmers’ conditions. Some did
indeed. Interviews showed that 38% of the promoted varieties, namely CK 4, CK
21 and CK 801, were adopted by farmers and entered local seed trade. In 2007 for
example, 4%, 2% and 1% of the rice farming households grew CK 21, CK 801 and
CK 4 respectively. In 2008, CK 21 was the third most sold variety after Saidou Gbéli
and Saidou Firê, the two most cultivated local varieties in the study area. CK 21
represented 14% of the total seed sales and was sold by 32% of the local seed dealers
at open markets (Okry et al., unpublished data). The total seed sale was estimated at
99.6 t in 2008. CK 4 and CK 801 were less represented in the seed trade at less than
1% of total seed sales each.
Contrary to the state-led intervention, the NGO-led intervention stressed the
professionalization of small-scale seed producers to promote a more lateral seed
distribution from many points at community level. It brought farmers into seed
development activities and trained them in seed production. It thus built farmers’
capacity, which is an essential step towards any professionalization. But the intervention
was less successful in developing seed businesses to service local communities. Farmers,
extension agents and researchers said most of the formal seed producers abandoned
their seed businesses after the project and subsidies ended.
A collaborative intervention. From 1997 and parallel to the NGO-led intervention, the
national agricultural research and extension service in collaboration with international
partners (AfricaRice and World Bank), launched a pilot programme to accelerate the
diffusion of Nerica (varieties of interspecific hybrid origin: O. glaberrima × O. sativa)
in Guinea. In order to allow farmers’ interaction with Nerica, a total of 116 and
210 UEPs were conducted across the country in 1997 and 1998, respectively. Trials
involved 15 varieties (3 landraces and 12 Nerica varieties). At the same time PVS was
introduced, but at a small scale. In 1999, only PVS trials were conducted and led to
the selection of four varieties: Nerica 3, Nerica 4, Nerica 6 and IAC 164 for large-scale
diffusion (IRAG, 2000).
The introduction of Nerica was accompanied by a fundamental change in
the research approach, triggered by this collaborative intervention. Prior to this
intervention, the agricultural research used UEP (described above) as the final stage of
research. After 1999 the UEP approach was abandoned in favour of PVS which is still
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the major on-farm research method in use. PVS and UEP are two similar approaches
advocating farmers’ participation in technology development. The difference is
that PVS involves farmers throughout the entire process of variety selection while
UEP brings in farmers only at the final stage with the sole purpose of distributing
improved varieties and other technologies to farmers. The UEP approach was not
specifically designed for variety selection as was PVS. The latter belongs to the range of
participatory crop improvement approaches developed in the late 1980s to early 1990s
to complement and/or improve the impact of the conventional breeding approaches.
It advocates farmers’ involvement at earlier stages of variety selection to assess a
wide range of existing but novel varieties (Witcombe et al., 1996) with the overall
objective of valuing their perspectives (Dorward et al., 2007; Morris and Bellon, 2004).
Schematically, four phases commonly compose a PVS: identification of farmers’ needs
in cultivars, a search for suitable cultivars to test with farmers, experimentation of
suitability of cultivars in farmers’ field and a wider dissemination of suitable cultivars
(Witcombe et al., 1996). Hence the success of a PVS largely depends on the type of
stakeholders involved (farmers, researchers, NGOs and other end-users), the way they
have been selected and the degree of their involvement, activities and timing, scale,
etc. (Dorward et al., 2007). With PVS, farmers are exposed to more new cultivars,
they have a larger stake in the selection of varieties compared to the conventional
breeding approaches and seed dissemination is expected to start from PVS sessions
using participating farmers as entry points to the community. As such PVS has the
potential to link the formal and the informal seed systems. Participatory varietal
selection is a flexible approach adaptable to the local context. During the collaborative
intervention in Guinea, research and extension co-ordinated PVS activities. According
to these stakeholders several technical and organizational aspects deviated the actual
implementation of PVS in Guinea from the one recommended (see Witcombe et al.,
1996; Dorward et al., 2007). Major weaknesses reported included:
1. Field staff were given limited time to learn the approach, to select participants and
set up trials. In most cases, in response to time constraints, they selected farmers
who were already formally collaborating as contact groups under the ‘training and
visit approach’ and/or friends to participate in PVS activities.
2. Trial set-up was left to extension staff who were already involved in many other
activities including seed dissemination activities of the NGO-led intervention. They
could not devote much time to PVS trials.
3. Limited supervision was given from headquarters because of financial constraints.
4. Frequency of visits of farmers to PVS trials largely depended on budget availability.
One or two visits were generally organized, but not always at the most crucial
growing stages (tillering, flowering and maturity).
According to informants, these limitations occurred at the beginning of the
intervention and were gradually overcome. However, the first two phases of PVS
(the identification of farmers’ needs for cultivars and the search for suitable cultivars
to experiment with farmers) have often been taken for granted, and the number of
farmers involved and frequency of visits have largely depended on budget availability.
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Like in the NGO-led intervention, the actual seed multiplication and dissemination
after variety selection through PVS were done by formal seed producers. Surveys
of 2007 and 2008 did not report any use of the introduced varieties in the study
area.
Other interventions. Other interventions were limited in scope. APEK, a local NGO,
supported research to implement participatory approaches such as PVS and CBSS.
APEK, like many other local NGOs (e.g. SARA), also distributed seed in emergency
situations at the request of the FAO and WFP (World Food Programme of the United
Nations). In its regular activities of seed dissemination APEK targeted farmers’
associations, rather than individual rice farmers, as requested by its donors and
partners (Guinée 44, IFAD, FAO, etc.) and in line with donor-proposed changes in
extension. Farmers organized in groups received seed of improved varieties from
APEK. They were expected to develop communal seed management strategies
to improve everyone’s access to seed. The actual seed management varied from
one farmers’ association to another, but it often excluded some farmers. For
example, in Bokariya-Tassen the farmers’ association loaned seed to farmers at
an interest rate of 20%, compared to the 50–100% charged by informal money
lenders. However, only group members could borrow seed from the association. In
Sangaran, 1.5 km from Bokariya-Tassen, the chairman charged 100% interest on
seed loans.
Comptoir Agricole, a medium-sized agro-dealer was also involved in seed relief
activities along with APEK at the request of the FAO and WFP. In addition, CA
developed a seed business. It bought seed (local as well as improved varieties) mainly
from individual farmers during harvest, which it stored and then sold at the start of
the next season, but did little or no seed processing. By 2007, it had a market capacity
of 200 t of seed per year. But CA met only 50% of this capacity in 2007. In July 2007,
CA sold rice seed at about US$ 0.80 per kilogram.
Apart from learning from past interventions, to construct a more sustainable seed
sector one also needs to understand the roles, perceptions and linkages of the different
stakeholders involved. The next section explores this.
Stakeholders of the rice seed sector
Characteristics and roles of stakeholders. Archival research and focus group discussions
with extension agents, researchers, NGO staff and farmers allowed us to identify
and characterize stakeholders of the rice seed sector (both formal and informal).
Subsequent surveys allowed further characterization. Following Jiggins and Collins
(2003), we grouped stakeholders into three classes: primary, intermediary and key
stakeholders (Table 1), and characterized them based on the roles they played and
would potentially play in the rice seed sector.
The national government, SG2000, World Bank and AfricaRice were key
stakeholders. They steered interventions through financial, technical and institutional
support, and policy development. Of these key stakeholders only the national
government was involved in all interventions described in the section above.
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Table 1. Characterization of the stakeholders of the rice seed sector based on archives, surveys and focus group
discussions 2007 and 2008.
Stakeholders
Class of
stakeholder†
Scope of
intervention Roles
Time frame of
intervention
Involvement
seed project
Individual farmers Primary Local (village) Seed use, management,
production and
dissemination
For many years:
they built the
farmer-seed sector
Yes
FOP-BG, farmer’s
association
Primary Local and
national
Current manager seed
centres
Since 2004 Yes
Participation in participatory
research activities
Since 1999
Local seed dealers Primary Local Seed sale, purchase and
production
14 years of
experience (on
average)
No
Agro-input
dealers: Comptoir
Agricole
Primary/in
termediary
Local and
national
Seed sale Since 1994 Yes
Seed centre (Guéckédou)
management
Since 2004
SPCIA
ANPROCA
(extension service)‡
Intermediary National Training of farmers Founded in 1987 Yes
Improved variety
dissemination
First rice seed
project in 1995
IRAG (National
Research Institute)
Intermediary National Research and breeding Founded in 1989 Yes
Elaboration and
implementation of seed
projects
First rice seed
project in 1995
APEK (NGO) Intermediary National Training, capacity building
of farmers
Founded in 1989 Yes
Seed project implementation
Seed distribution
Ministry of
Agriculture
Key National Agricultural development
policy
Since the 1980s Yes
Funding
Sassakawa Global
2000§
Key Supranational Dissemination of improved
varieties and agricultural
inputs
From 1996 to
2003
Yes
Funding
Africa Rice Center
(AfricaRice)
Key Supranational Technical support Founded in 1971 Yes
First intervention
in 1997
WB, FAO, WFP,
IFAD
Key Supranational Funding Yes
Support policy development
†Primary stakeholders are those who are directly affected, either positively or negatively by seed projects or
interventions in the seed sector. Intermediary stakeholders are the intermediaries in the delivery or execution of seed
project, research programmes and resource flows. Key stakeholders are those with the power to influence or ‘kill’
activity (adapted from Jiggins and Collins 2003).
‡Has suffered from lack of funds since early 2000s.
§No longer intervening in Guinea.
Research and extension were mandated to implement the state’s vision of
agricultural development through the Ministry of Agriculture. They also acted as
intermediaries for AfricaRice, World Bank and SG2000 to implement the seed
projects described above. Research and extension were therefore the most influential
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intermediary stakeholders. Comptoir Agricole and NGOs (e.g. APEK) were also
intermediary stakeholders who: (i) as previously mentioned released emergency seed
along with research and extension at request of FAO and WFP; (ii) trained farmers
and (iii) implemented seed projects as partner of the national agricultural research and
AfricaRice. In addition, CA has developed a seed business.
So far, the role of farmers in the formal seed sector has been limited to contractual
labour provision for seed multiplication. Of course, those who took part in PVS helped
to make decisions on the varieties to be disseminated by the formal seed sector. Rice
farmers play a role mainly in the informal seed sector. Various studies have shown
they have experience in seed and variety management (selection, use, production and
dissemination) to meet diverse objectives of food production (Louwaars 2007; Nuijten
et al., 2009; Richards 2009). From 2005 to 2007 each household used on average 77 kg
of rice seed per year of which 70% were own farm-saved. Seed acquired from outside
the farm was used for different purposes. For example, in 2007 seeds from outside
the farm can be split in seed of new varieties (40%), seed for field enlargement (38%),
seed to complement own seed because of shortage (18%) and seed to renew own seed
because of mixture (3%). About 2% of it was used to establish new rice fields (youth).
Farmers developed several ways of acquiring seed. Our interviews revealed that
from 2005 to 2007 seed from outside the farm was obtained through seed exchange
with fellow farmers (50%), purchase with cash (35%), loan (7%), gift (4%), labour
exchange (2%) and barter deals (2%). Of seed purchased with cash, 30% came from
occasional seed sale by relatives and friends from the same village, 53% came from
relatives, friends and seed dealers of neighbouring villages, 15% from local seed dealers
established at open markets and 1% from CA. Interviewed households did not mention
the formal seed producers as source of purchased seed. They were, however, mentioned
as potential seed sources during focus group discussions. Table 2 presents outputs of
such focus group discussion conducted in Dandakhouré to compare external seed
sources (seed from outside the village). Five external seed sources were in use: the rice
research unit of Kilissi (CRAK), the seed centre of Kilissi, a formal seed producer, local
seed dealers established at open market and, friends, relatives and local seed dealers
from neighbouring villages. According to farmers, seed from local dealers at open
markets and seed from non-experienced local seed dealers at village level was often
mixed, whereas seed from research and seed centres was pure. Nevertheless, farmers
said that they did not often visit research and seed centres for seed because of the
high seed prices, the limited choice they offered (exclusively improved varieties), and
the limited availability of seed (Table 2). Farmers made similar comments about the
formal seed producer even though at points in time he would offer a few local varieties
in addition to improved ones (Okry et al., 2011). Despite the criticism of seed mixture
farmers said they preferred seed from local seed dealers because of the relatively low
seed price, the large diversity they offered and the large quantities of seed they usually
have available.
Subsequent interviews with local seed dealers revealed that in 2008 none of them
had ever collaborated with a seed project even though on average they had spent 14
years selling rice seed. Local seed dealers distributed seed by sale, loan, barter and
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Table 2. External seed sources and preferences of farmers for external seed sources.†
Research centre and
seed centre (Kilissi)
Formal seed
producer
Local seed dealers
at open market
Farmers and local
dealers from
neighbouring villages
Distance from village
to indicated seed
source (km)
37 6 19 Varies
Farmers’ indication of
seed availability
Limited seed
availability
Limited seed
availability
High seed
availability
High seed availability
Seed mixture Not mixed Not mixed Mixed Fairly mixed
Diversity Exclusively
improved varieties
More
improved
varieties than
local varieties
More local
varieties than
improved varieties
More local varieties
than improved varieties
Average prices (US$
kg−1) in 2007 and
2008‡
1.3 1.3 0.5 0.4
Prices appreciation by
farmers
Expensive Expensive Affordable Cheap
Farmers’ indication of
their preference for an
external seed source
Little used seed
source
Little used
seed source
Important seed
source
Important seed source
Source: Group discussion in the village of Dandakhouré in November 2007 (n = 22).
†External seed sources refer to seed collected from outside the village of Dandakhouré. ‡Prices in the table are
averages of price ranges given by participants. They are consistent with prices recorded during surveys. 1US$ = 3800
Guinean franc.
even as gifts. Their seed price increased from the beginning to the end of the sowing
season with an average of US$ 0.50 per kilogram in July–August 2008. About 40%
of the local seed dealers were also seed producers (non-formal), the rest were traders.
Barter deals involved palm oil and mainly took place in remote areas (e.g. villages
of Site 1). Thirty litres of palm oil were exchanged for about 50 kg of seed. Seed
loans were only granted to regular customers. Payment was generally made after six
months (at harvest) either in cash or in rice. The interest rate varied widely according
to the relationship between client and dealer. Seed dealers occasionally gave gifts of
seed in cases of misfortune. Local seed dealers also used seed gifts to secure labour
for the coming cropping season. Farmers acquired seed through barter, loan or gift
only when they have strong ties with seed dealers; those with weak ties can only buy
seed. Purity, good germination rate and adaptability of varieties to local environment
were the main characteristics sought by farmers. All seed dealers aimed to offer such
seed to secure customers: ‘Only good quality seed establishes customer loyalty and
keeps the seed business going,’ dealers said. Good quality seed here refers to seed
purity, cleanness and germination rate. Each local seed dealer was linked to several
rice growers who, together with their friends and relatives, formed a customer group.
Seed dealers therefore entered farmers’ networks and sustained their seed business by
selling ‘good quality seed’ in different ways.
Farmers controlled seed dealers through information sharing within their networks.
News of any cheating or false information about seed quality or varietal characteristics
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were said to spread quickly within the farming community and may result in significant
loss of customers and even exclusion of suspect seed dealers from the networks. Local
seed dealers seemed to be strategic seed suppliers, but their future involvement in seed
programmes/interventions will be largely influenced by the perceptions of the various
stakeholders.
Conflicting roles and perceptions of stakeholders on one another’s roles. Focus group discussions
with different stakeholders revealed their diverse perspectives on how the seed sector
functions. Research, extension and seed centres tended to blame individual farmers
when seed and varieties do not flow as expected (Table 3). For researchers, farmers
should just use the improved varieties they released. Seed centres thought that
farmers do not know the value of ‘quality seed’ of improved varieties. The extension
service believed farmers are incapable of achieving any good development unless
under assistance. These views, contrasted against farmers’ reasons for using seed
of the informal seed distribution channels, reveal poor communication between the
actors of the formal seed sector and farmers about the reasons of non-adoption
of improved varieties and the limited use of seed from the formal sector. More
specifically, the perception of the extension service depicts its top-down vision of seed
development showing that the collaboration between extension and farmers (formal
seed producers) that occurred during the NGO-led intervention did not alter much
the rigid view it held and likely inherited from the training and visit era. It illustrates
their negative attitude about farmers’ ability to produce and/or sell seed.
While local NGOs saw themselves as the main current extension agencies, the
extension service perceived the NGOs as simple ‘extension tools’ that should be at
their disposal. Since the extension service has suffered from financial problems since
2003, they saw NGOs more as competitors. As both have developed expertise in
farmer training, institutional arrangements that favour collaboration might increase
their impact.
Extension and research denied the existence of local seed dealers (Table 3). They
regarded seed dealers as paddy traders. This perception illustrates the formal sector’s
tedious distinction between ‘seed’ and ‘grain’. The scant scientific attention paid to
local practices and institutions of seed production, selection and management does
not allow a fair appreciation of farmers’ capacities to produce and sell seed. It is
true that for many crops much remains to be done on quality (purity and sanitary
measures) of farmer’s seed but one should not deny farmers’ capacity to produce and
manage seed of self-pollinated crops like rice (Nuijten, 2005). In Guinea, research
and extension may not have acknowledged the existence of local seed dealers because
dealers operate within the informal seed sector, which is still of less importance to
them. This poor interaction between the formal and the informal seed sectors could
also explain why some farmers and local seed dealers did not know about the existence
of stakeholders of the formal seed sector except for the NGOs – likely because the
latter train farmers in many domains, such as animal traction, adult literacy and
co-operative management.
Institutional linkages. Key stakeholders at the international level are linked one-way
with the Ministry of Agriculture and intermediary stakeholders targeting financial
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Table 3. Stakeholders’ perceptions of one another’s roles in the seed sector, based on focus group discussions and surveys in 2007 and 2008.†
ANPROCA IRAG
APEK and SARA
(NGOs) Seed centres
Comptoir
Agricole (CA) Local seed dealers Individual farmers
ANPROCA – Partner in seed
project elaboration
and implementation
Strengthen the
extension system
Currently non
operational. Their role
is partly played by
CRAK (IRAG)
0‡ They are not seed
dealers. They are
rather paddy dealers
Incapable of achieving
any good development.
They constantly need
assistance
Resources ANPROCA
should use
IRAG Partner in
programme
elaboration and
implementation
– Partners (seed
dissemination)
Need to be strengthened Partners in seed
distribution
They are not seed
dealers. They are
rather paddy dealers
Should use improved
varieties and seed from
the formal seed sector
APEK and
SARA
(NGOs)
Training partner Training partner – Non-effective Partner
(occasional seed
distribution)
Very small-scale
business holders
Need to be empowered
Seed centres Lacks funds to
operate properly
Tends to play the
role of seed centres
Useful dissemination
network
– Competing
stakeholder
Very small-scale
business holders
They do not know the
value of ‘quality’ seed
Paddy dealers
Comptoir
Agricole
(CA)
0 Partners in seed
delivery
Partners in seed
delivery
Should be closed – Competing
stakeholder
Customers
(commercial
relationships)
Local seed
dealers
Unknown§ Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown – Customers
(commercial and trust
relationships)
Individual
farmers
Non-effective
(absent in the field)
Seed rarely available
Unknown to some
Training of farmer’s
associations. Little
attention to
non-group-members
Frequent seed shortage
Unknown to some
Unknown to
some farmers
Major seed suppliers −
Unknown to some
farmers
farmers farmers
†In the first column are the respondents. In the top row are the stakeholders on whom the perceptions are expressed.
‡0 means there is no perception expressed on that stakeholder. From this it is deduced that there is no tension between them.
§Unknown means the responding stakeholder does not know the stakeholder or does not know the roles it plays in the rice seed sector.
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resources and assistance through them. Among international key stakeholders,
only AfricaRice provided seed of improved varieties, of which multiplication and
dissemination rested mainly within research and extension. AfricaRice also provided
technical assistance.
At the national level, seed and varieties moved in two different ways. Research,
extension and APEK organized a vertical and one-way seed distribution starting from
research centres to farming communities via formal seed producers and farmers’
associations. Farmers’ association and formal seed producers would therefore link the
farming community to the formal seed system. At the community level seed moves
more laterally as a result of the relations between farmers, and those between farmers
and local seed dealers. In fact, seed and money flows two ways between individual
farmers and local seed dealers who are both seed providers and buyers. Seed is also
exchanged between them through a wide range of arrangements (cash, loan, gift and
barter) while seed exchange occurred only with cash between farmers and formal
seed producers. It is however important to note that local seed dealers had the fewest
linkages with other stakeholders: they were linked only to rice growers and to some
extent had loose relations with money lenders (because of high interest rate applied –
50 to 100%) from whom they get credit in bad years. They have no direct links with
stakeholders of the formal seed sector. Nevertheless, through their informal networks,
seed dealers would benefit (indirectly) from technical information that extension,
NGOs and research disseminated.
Comptoir Agricole developed business linkages with individual farmers and from
time to time received seed from research (CRAK) when these had surplus seed, and
also sold seed to farmers exclusively on a cash basis.
Farmers’ associations have a two-way linkage with farmers. Farmers borrowed seed
from them and reimbursed at harvest with seed plus an interest. In addition, farmers’
associations linked the formal and the informal seed systems in a more direct way:
members of an association who benefited from seeds shared them with other farmers
and relatives.
Research, extension and APEK developed one-way links with formal seed producers
and farmers’ associations despite the collaborations they previously had. In fact,
farmers’ associations and formal seed producers rarely emerged independently.
Farmers’ associations were established at the request of extension, and currently
of NGOs, and evolved under their financial and technical assistance. Formal seed
producers were selected, trained and helped financially by the extension service and
research. As a result, research, extension and NGOs tended to have patron-client
relationships with farmers’ associations and formal seed producers.
D I S C U S S I O N
Learning from past interventions
Seed programmes in the past two decades have used different intervention
approaches that have led to different outcomes. The state-led intervention failed
mainly because of the unsuitability of the recommended varieties. It regarded farmers
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as end-users and did not involve them in the choice of varieties. This attitude likely
resulted from the influence of the conventional research approach used in the 1980s.
The selection of too few varieties for wide dissemination could also be seen as another
cause of failure of this intervention. In fact, small-scale farmers operate in diverse
environments and seek a range of varieties that match their specific ecologies and
needs (Nuijten, 2005; Richards, 1986). The organization of seed distribution during
this state intervention also hampered its success. Distributing improved varieties from
a few locations (four seed centres) prevented farmers from remote areas such as
Bokariya from accessing these varieties unless they paid for transportation resulting in
high transaction costs, which are known to hamper farmers’ use of improved varieties
(Almekinders et al., 1994). Cromwell and Tripp (1994) also remarked that farmers’
decisions on new seed acquisitions are often last-minute decisions and require seed to
be readily available and nearby.
The NGO-led intervention that followed the state intervention did not involve
farmers in variety selection either. But it increased the number of varieties made
available to farmers. Our findings showed that 38% of these varieties successfully
entered the informal seed system and were cultivated by 7% of the rice farming
households a decade later. Those varieties were likely the most suitable among the
distributed improved varieties, suggesting that the dissemination of a larger number
of varieties, when farmers are not involved in selection processes, increases chance of
adoption. Since our surveys covered only Lower Guinea, different figures may emerge
for other regions.
The centralized seed dissemination during the state-led intervention did not service
farmers from remote areas. The NGO-led intervention improved on that by training
small-scale seed producers in order to multiply and decentralize seed distribution
points at the community level. As our findings show this organizational setting
successfully built on the capacity of the farmers involved, which is essential to sustain
the process of professionalizing small-scale seed production and distribution. However,
the actual objective of establishing seed enterprises received insufficient attention. With
projects buying all the seed, seed producers did not develop the necessary skills and
knowledge to properly market seed, e.g. gauging farmers’ seed demands, determining
farmers’ preference for varieties, developing mechanisms of price formation and
strategies of advertisement. Other relevant aspects of seed market development,
such as packaging and branding, were of less importance in this subsistence rice
cultivation. Many formal seed producers saw themselves as service suppliers to the
seed projects and quickly left their seed enterprise once projects and inputs subsidies
ended. This finding adds to the range of similar experiences across developing
countries (Almekinders and Thiele, 2003). Besides, recruitment criteria for formal
seed producers (land ownership and literacy) may have led to the selection of better-
off or elite farmers who found better livelihood opportunities than seed production
after projects ended. In all, the observed spread of improved varieties through the
NGO-led intervention likely resulted from the conjunction of the adaptability of
cultivars to farmers’ conditions, and the subsequent dissemination through informal
channels and to a lesser extent through formal seed producers.
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Contrary to the other interventions, the collaborative intervention did involve
farmers in variety selection to avoid failure due to the rejection of varieties. The
fact that only Nerica varieties were disseminated through this intervention seemed
logical since the project was conceived for Nerica dissemination. That our surveys of
2007 and 2008 did not report any use of the varieties introduced via the collaborative
intervention could be partly due to the scope of data collection. Extension agents and
researchers mentioned that the Nerica varieties were most successful in Forest Guinea
and Middle Guinea, rather than in Lower Guinea, even though they were selected in
Lower Guinea. In Lower Guinea CRAK is still actively multiplying Nerica varieties
for dissemination to other regions of the country. Also the variety naming system at
community level may result in different varieties obtaining the same name. Varieties
were often named following the person who introduced them or the area where they
were first encountered. As such, varieties introduced by this collaborative intervention
may have been renamed. Besides, the name ‘chinois’ systematically given, in the study
area, to any unknown improved varieties adds to this complexity. Similar complexities
in variety naming have been observed in The Gambia (Nuijten and Almekinders,
2008). A proper tracking of the introduced varieties would require more resources
than those available for this study.
Like the NGO-led intervention, the collaborative intervention also formally relied
on formal seed producers to multiply and disseminate seed. Here again, the seed
produced was entirely bought by projects for large-scale dissemination. To better
sustain impacts on the seed sector, projects could have considered enlarging lists of
stakeholders to include local seed producers and dealers in addition to the ‘promoted’
formal seed producers. As our findings show local seed dealers operated independently,
without any direct support from the formal seed sector and have developed customer
networks that could serve the formal seed sector. Even though training might have
made formal seed producers technically better than local seed producers, local seed
dealers have a better understanding of the seed market than the newly trained formal
seed producers.
Unsupervised seed dissemination results from participation in PVS sessions.
Dorward et al. (2007) provided evidence on how a small quantity of suitable cultivars
acquired by participants in PVS sessions quickly spread among farmers. Further,
Marfo et al. (2008) showed the usefulness of informal channels in disseminating seed of
suitable improved varieties in Ghana. Witcombe et al. (1999) specifically highlighted
the roles of seed merchants in disseminating seed of varieties selected with PVS in
India. Thus, because of the approach used (PVS) the collaborative intervention had
the potential to link the formal and the informal seed systems. In practice this potential
was not fully utilized. As the study shows, farmers participating in the PVS sessions
were not selected on a sound basis, major players in the informal seed system (e.g.
local seed dealers) were ignored and seed multiplication systematically given to only the
formal seed producers. Unsupervised seed dissemination may add to the efforts of the
formal seed sector to supply seed of improved varieties to smallholders. In this regard,
we suggest that PVS adapts more to context specificities. In principle, PVS allows
flexibility in its implementation like all other participatory approaches. But because
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of the large geographical coverage (international) projects often use PVS rigidly, not
allowing space to adapt to local conditions or be more flexible towards building on
local seed systems. In the case of Guinea, proper identification of stakeholders would
have revealed the existence of local seed dealers and their involvement at the very
beginning of the PVS would have been beneficial. Also, instead of late involvement
(only post-harvest) as PVS guidelines often recommend for traders (Dorward et al.,
2007), early involvement of local seed dealers would offer opportunities to collect
perspectives from their customer networks.
Ways forwards
Getting rid of subsidies for small-scale rice seed enterprises. Since 2004, seed centres have
rarely functioned except to supply seed to cope with emergency. Rossignol (2008)
argued that they could not run cost-effectively to only cover the seed demand of
smallholders and meet their price preferences unless there are subsidies. Even though
subsidies are indispensable for large seed industries of self-pollinated and orphan
crops, maintaining long-term subsidies for the Guinean seed industry may be too
demanding for the government even if this might be an option to consider in the
future. In the short run, alternatives that reduce overheads might best fit the current
rice production context. With the NGO-led intervention, the formal seed producers
were indeed promoted as alternatives to reduce the costs of production of seed of
improved varieties. Most of them have left their seed enterprise after subsidies ended.
The few remaining formal seed producers offered seed at a price that smallholders
could not afford, because of expensive inputs (chemicals) required. The high seed
production costs, passed on in the final seed prices, prevent farmers from buying
formal seed (see also Almekinders et al., 2007; Ndjeunga, 2002). In addition to the
high price of seed from the formal sector, several studies reported farmers’ reluctance
to pay more than the grain price for quality seed, especially that of self-pollinated crops
(Almekinders and Thiele, 2003; Sperling, 2002). However, many African farmers are
willing to pay more for quality seed whenever grain market prices are favourable
(Van Mele et al., 2011). To Jaffee and Srivastava (1994) only small seed enterprises
that carry low overheads are likely to profit from and sustain the production of seed
of self-pollinated crops. This view is consistent with the findings by Bentley et al.
(2001) who reported the development of several successful small rice seed companies
in Peru. Success was mainly due to the fact that small seed companies own capital
and resources to enter the seed business and most importantly because they had links
with farmers that help them market their seed (Bentley et al., 2001). As our findings
show, the local seed dealers have developed consistent expertise in the rice seed trade.
Strengthening them is an option to consider when developing independent networks
of seed distributors. A recent study in nine African countries revealed that all successful
small- and medium-scale seed enterprises were able to bridge the formal and informal
seed sector, to manage their cash flow and to market their seed (Van Mele et al., 2011).
Bridging the two seed systems. In general the formal seed system fails to serve smallholders
(Ndjeunga, 2002; Seboka and Deressa 2000; Wiggens and Cromwell, 1995) and
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various researchers have explored ways to combine the positive attributes of the
formal and informal seed systems (Almekinders and Thiele, 2003; Song, 1998). To
integrate both systems, Seboka and Deressa (2000) recommended a redefinition of
the role of extension services. They believe that extension services can improve seed
supplies by organizing farmers and promoting institutional linkages. David (2004)
specifically suggested training of farmers groups to become specialized seed producers
who will develop into farmer seed enterprises. Our study revealed that even working
with farmers’ associations did not guarantee farmers’ access to seed. The relations
between formal seed producers and seed projects, along with the exclusive membership
and managerial problems of farmers’ associations, did not allow seed to be effectively
distributed to most smallholders. Almekinders and Louwaars (2002) suggested that
the formal seed system feeds the informal one with new technologies, e.g. iron resistant
or drought tolerant varieties. To them the role of the formal seed system is to produce
relatively small but crucial amounts of high quality seed to be injected into the farmer
system at suitable moments and places. In our case of Guinea, and consistent with
David (2004), farmers’ associations and formal seed producers form the current link
between the formal and informal seed systems. This might become a functional
relation if only government agencies would become more open to and encourage
feedback from these actors. Local seed dealers selling both improved and local varieties
might also provide a new junction between both seed systems.
Empowering local seed dealers. The extension service in Guinea currently lacks funds
to properly function. The few existing local NGOs operate on a relatively small scale.
Our findings showed that farmer networks and seed dealers were frequently used
channels for information sharing and seed dissemination, as found for many other
agro-ecologies and crops (Ndjeunga, 2002; Jones et al., 2001; Tripp and Pal, 2001;
Witcombe et al., 1999), although social differentiation and geographical distance could
raise barriers to seed dissemination through farmer networks (Almekinders and Thiele,
2003). Our study also showed that local seed dealers improved the availability of
seed at the community level thus increasing the chance of adoption and spread of
improved varieties. This is particularly important since seed availability is considered
a prerequisite to adoption (David et al., 2002; Witcombe et al., 1999). Encouraging
farmer-to-farmer seed dissemination might be an option whereby state organizations
and NGOs would (in addition to the formal seed producers) train existing local seed
producers and dealers in appropriate techniques of seed multiplication and processing
while giving them the managerial skills needed to enlarge their enterprises. Similar
suggestions were made for pearl millet (Ndjeunga, 2002) and beans (Rubyogo and
Sperling, 2009). Local seed dealers and producers would thus provide additional
meeting points between the formal and the farmer seed systems. The role of seed
projects and research centres would be to introduce new varieties into the farming
community via local seed dealers and other agro-dealers, whose capacities they would
strengthen to raise the sanitary and physiological quality of the seed they sell. This
would reduce seed production and transaction costs rendering seed more affordable
to smallholders and leading to the uptake and spread using both formal and informal
dissemination channels. But such an approach would function only if cultivars are
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suitable and their seed available (at least at the beginning), as illustrated in this
paper. While seed availability could be somehow solved by political commitment
and strong managerial skills, the adaptability of varieties to farmers’ conditions has
technical aspects and would require careful methodological recommendations that
are beyond the scope of this study. A good use of PVS approaches in combination with
a careful consideration of the specificities of each agro-ecology are options to further
explore.
Speed of seed dissemination also matters for seed interventions. A good exposure of
farmers to suitable varieties would speed up seed dissemination, and hence, improve
adoption (Witcombe et al., 1996). The recent review of African seed enterprises by
Van Mele et al. (2011) also reveals that some agro-dealers have begun to take the
lead in testing varieties and communicating results with their (potential) clients. Our
study in Guinea shows the importance of local seed dealers in supplying seed to
farmers and their potential role in improving farmers’ exposure to new cultivars.
Their involvement, in addition to the formal seed producers, in seed multiplication
and dissemination could be considered to speed up dissemination processes. However,
current perceptions of research and extension do not favour such collaboration. A
move away from the hierarchical relations of state and (sometimes) NGOs would
allow more flexible and open decision-making and enhance interaction with other,
previously marginalized stakeholders. These shifts in mindsets may happen when
formal players experience the benefits of working with people who play significant
roles in the informal seed system. Scientists and development workers have much
to gain by considering farmers as equal partners, who also have knowledge to share.
Farmers not only look for better varieties but are also active agents of crop development
(Nuijten et al., 2009; Richards, 1986). Respectful feedback loops between farmers and
stakeholders of the formal system are currently lacking.
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